No Vandalism: Privacy-Preserving and Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning

Authors: Zhibo Xing, Zijian Zhang, Zi’ang Zhang, Jiamou Liu, Liehuang Zhu, Giovanni Russello
Published: 2024-06-03

Source: https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01080

PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2406.01080

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ポイズニング バックドア攻撃 ウォーターマーキング

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Abstract

Federated learning allows several clients to train one machine learning model jointly without sharing private data, providing privacy protection. However, traditional federated learning is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, which can not only decrease the model performance, but also implant malicious backdoors. In addition, direct submission of local model parameters can also lead to the privacy leakage of the training dataset. In this paper, we aim to build a privacy-preserving and Byzantine-robust federated learning scheme to provide an environment with no vandalism (NoV) against attacks from malicious participants. Specifically, we construct a model filter for poisoned local models, protecting the global model from data and model poisoning attacks. This model filter combines zero-knowledge proofs to provide further privacy protection. Then, we adopt secret sharing to provide verifiable secure aggregation, removing malicious clients that disrupting the aggregation process. Our formal analysis proves that NoV can protect data privacy and weed out Byzantine attackers. Our experiments illustrate that NoV can effectively address data and model poisoning attacks, including PGD, and outperforms other related schemes.