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Abstract
Machine Learning (ML) techniques can facilitate the automation of malicious
software (malware for short) detection, but suffer from evasion attacks. Many
studies counter such attacks in heuristic manners, lacking theoretical
guarantees and defense effectiveness. In this paper, we propose a new
adversarial training framework, termed Principled Adversarial Malware Detection
(PAD), which offers convergence guarantees for robust optimization methods. PAD
lays on a learnable convex measurement that quantifies distribution-wise
discrete perturbations to protect malware detectors from adversaries, whereby
for smooth detectors, adversarial training can be performed with theoretical
treatments. To promote defense effectiveness, we propose a new mixture of
attacks to instantiate PAD to enhance deep neural network-based measurements
and malware detectors. Experimental results on two Android malware datasets
demonstrate: (i) the proposed method significantly outperforms the
state-of-the-art defenses; (ii) it can harden ML-based malware detection
against 27 evasion attacks with detection accuracies greater than 83.45%, at
the price of suffering an accuracy decrease smaller than 2.16% in the absence
of attacks; (iii) it matches or outperforms many anti-malware scanners in
VirusTotal against realistic adversarial malware.