With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), ensuring their safe use becomes increasingly critical. Fine-tuning is a widely used method for adapting models to downstream tasks, yet it is vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. However, most existing studies focus on overly simplified attack scenarios, limiting their practical relevance to real-world defense settings. To make this risk concrete, we present a three-pronged jailbreak attack and evaluate it against provider defenses under a dataset-only black-box fine-tuning interface. In this setting, the attacker can only submit fine-tuning data to the provider, while the provider may deploy defenses across stages: (1) pre-upload data filtering, (2) training-time defensive fine-tuning, and (3) post-training safety audit. Our attack combines safety-styled prefix/suffix wrappers, benign lexical encodings (underscoring) of sensitive tokens, and a backdoor mechanism, enabling the model to learn harmful behaviors while individual datapoints appear innocuous. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. In real-world deployment, our method successfully jailbreaks GPT-4.1 and GPT-4o on the OpenAI platform with attack success rates above 97% for both models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lxf728/tri-pronged-ft-attack.