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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence (AI) hardware accelerators have been widely adopted
to enhance the efficiency of deep learning applications. However, they also
raise security concerns regarding their vulnerability to power side-channel
attacks (SCA). In these attacks, the adversary exploits unintended
communication channels to infer sensitive information processed by the
accelerator, posing significant privacy and copyright risks to the models.
Advanced machine learning algorithms are further employed to facilitate the
side-channel analysis and exacerbate the privacy issue of AI accelerators.
Traditional defense strategies naively inject execution noise to the runtime of
AI models, which inevitably introduce large overheads.
In this paper, we present AIAShield, a novel defense methodology to safeguard
FPGA-based AI accelerators and mitigate model extraction threats via
power-based SCAs. The key insight of AIAShield is to leverage the prominent
adversarial attack technique from the machine learning community to craft
delicate noise, which can significantly obfuscate the adversary's side-channel
observation while incurring minimal overhead to the execution of the protected
model. At the hardware level, we design a new module based on ring oscillators
to achieve fine-grained noise generation. At the algorithm level, we repurpose
Neural Architecture Search to worsen the adversary's extraction results.
Extensive experiments on the Nvidia Deep Learning Accelerator (NVDLA)
demonstrate that AIAShield outperforms existing solutions with excellent
transferability.