Tony T. Wang;Adam Gleave;Tom Tseng;Kellin Pelrine;Nora Belrose;Joseph Miller;Michael D. Dennis;Yawen Duan;Viktor Pogrebniak;Sergey Levine;Stuart Russell
These labels were automatically added by AI and may be inaccurate. For details, see About Literature Database.
Abstract
We attack the state-of-the-art Go-playing AI system KataGo by training
adversarial policies against it, achieving a >97% win rate against KataGo
running at superhuman settings. Our adversaries do not win by playing Go well.
Instead, they trick KataGo into making serious blunders. Our attack transfers
zero-shot to other superhuman Go-playing AIs, and is comprehensible to the
extent that human experts can implement it without algorithmic assistance to
consistently beat superhuman AIs. The core vulnerability uncovered by our
attack persists even in KataGo agents adversarially trained to defend against
our attack. Our results demonstrate that even superhuman AI systems may harbor
surprising failure modes. Example games are available https://goattack.far.ai/.