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Abstract
Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCAs) extract sensitive information by using
audio emitted from a computing devices and their peripherals. Attacks targeting
keyboards are popular and have been explored in the literature. However,
similar attacks targeting other human interface peripherals, such as computer
mice, are under-explored. To this end, this paper considers security leakage
via acoustic signals emanating from normal mouse usage. We first confirm
feasibility of such attacks by showing a proof-of-concept attack that
classifies four mouse movements with 97% accuracy in a controlled environment.
We then evolve the attack towards discerning twelve unique mouse movements
using a smartphone to record the experiment. Using Machine Learning (ML)
techniques, the model is trained on an experiment with six participants to be
generalizable and discern among twelve movements with 94% accuracy. In
addition, we experiment with an attack that detects a user action of closing a
full-screen window on a laptop. Achieving an accuracy of 91%, this experiment
highlights exploiting audio leakage from computer mouse movements in a
realistic scenario.
External Datasets
dataset comprising ten samples for all 26 English alphabet keys
6,000 samples for each direction (total of 24,000 samples)
∼21,000 samples of audio MFCCs and mouse movement angles